
By Lord Fiifi Quayle
This controversy over the Ghana Gold Board (commonly referred to as GoldBod) purchasing activities, and the conflict of interest in the case of Stan Dogbe; has graduated beyond a standard procurement issue, into a much bigger one, namely, an institutional credibility issue.
The controversy seems mundane at first sight. A government agency buys laptops and makes office improvement. The criticism concerns pricing, procurement processes, and the closeness of a contractor to a politically sensitive person.
Authorities countered that procurement followed the requirements and got the approvals. Theoretically, the issue is procedural.
Institutions are made not out of paper only. They are built on trust.
GoldBod is not a common-sense governmental agency. It is an institution that aims at restructuring the Ghanaian gold economy. In the event of its success, it will collect gold in the artisanal mining industry, affect the exportation flows, and possibly be a stabilizing factor to the foreign exchange earnings in the country.
That is to say, GoldBod is a strategic economic tool; in the long-run, having the same significance as Ghana Cocoa Board in the cocoa industry.
When it comes to an institution of such strategic importance, the level of standards that should be used must be on the rise, rather than on the lower.
It is not the question whether a procurement process was technically in compliance with rules or not. The more important issue is whether the choices that were made in that procurement are indicative of the discipline that is needed to create a credible national institution.
In public finance, the issue of perception is not a trivial one. It is an economic variable.
When stakeholders, which include miners, financiers, international traders, and policy makers, start to suspect that a new strategic institution is vulnerable to elite proximity or informal influence, the credibility premium of the new strategic institution start to be undermined even before it had even reached maturity. Domestic and international markets do not respond simply to facts, but to signals as well.
It is due to this fact that conflict-of-interest questions are so delicate. They seldom concern evidence of misconduct; they concern the semblance of institutional distance between opportunity and power.
The fact that Stan Dogbe, one of the senior officials in the Presidency, is participating in the wider public discourse, either directly or just through purported corporate affiliations, demonstrates the fine line that GoldBod has to walk.
Institutions of a country which strategically manage important resources cannot risk uncertainty regarding the autonomy of processes.
It should not be confused, accusations do not make a person guilty. The existence of procurement law has been specifically to offer a solution of carrying out a procedure that would offer fairness. When the Public Procurement Authority passed approval on the methodology that was employed and the procedure was adhered to in the right way, then that aspect should be given a credit.
However, compliance is the bottom and not the top of institutional governance.
Strategic institutions need to develop a culture of visible integrity as well. This implies transparency that is not just minimum-based, but also active and voluntary publication of procurement information, and openness to questioning one of their decisions without defensiveness. Credibility is built gradually and demolished easily in emerging institutional ecosystems.
The centre of GoldBod is a significantly bigger economic ambition than the repositioning of Ghana in the global gold economy. It is a major gold producer in the world, but in the past, the country has only been able to reap a portion of the financial benefits of that resource.
GoldBod will work based on the promise of aggregation of supply, increase transparency of the small-scale mining sector and may encourage innovations like gold-backed financial instruments.
To actualise such ambitions, the institution needs to ensure that it wins the confidence of not only the government but also the banks, the investors, and the miners, and even the international partners.
Trust is not written. It is earned.
The prevailing controversy hence offers GoldBod an opportunity and not just a challenge. The institution can prove that it takes its mandate seriously by acting in a transparent way by publishing the procurement documentation, explaining corporate relations and enhancing the governance protection.
In the long path of economic development, countries do not just emerge through resource discovery but through the creation of institutions that handle such resources with credibility.
Ghana has the gold. The question now turns out to be whether it will also show the institutional discipline demanded to manage that wealth.
The GoldBod and conflict-of-interest controversy should not thus degenerate into partisan theatre. It must rather be a reminder of the fact that legitimacy of new institutions is created in its first decisions.
The cost of a laptop purchase is hardly ever talked about in history. But it never forgets to ask institutions on whether they were constructed on trust or not.
GHANA MUST WORK

