
By Lord Fiifi Quayle
By the time Ghana’s latest IMF review was released, the reaction from official communicators followed a familiar pattern. When the language sounded reassuring, it was amplified as proof of competence and recovery. When it was cautious; carefully worded, conditional, and alert to risk- it was questioned, downplayed, or quietly dismissed.
This selective respect for institutions sets a dangerous precedent.
The International Monetary Fund has become a convenient authority in Ghana’s public discourse: elevated to the status of final arbiter when its assessments flatter government messaging, and treated with suspicion when they do not. Yet the IMF’s value lies precisely in its caution. Its role is not to validate political narratives, but to assess sustainability, risk, and credibility in ways that markets can trust.
Undermining that caution does not strengthen Ghana’s story. It weakens it.
Institutions Are Not Mood Rings
The IMF is not a political actor. It does not operate on the rhythms of press conferences or election cycles. Its language is deliberately conservative because it speaks to audiences far beyond domestic consumption; bondholders, rating agencies, multilaterals, and governments weighing exposure to risk.
When the Fund says progress has been made but risks remain elevated, it is not hedging. It is doing its job.
Yet too often, official responses suggest discomfort with this role. Caution is framed as pessimism. Balance is treated as hostility. The same institution praised as the benchmark of truth one week is accused of being out of touch the next.
Markets notice this inconsistency long before citizens do.
The Gold Trade Example We Keep Missing
Consider the current debate around gold transactions, the Bank of Ghana, and GoldBod.
A more honest and institutionally respectful narrative would acknowledge that yes, the Bank of Ghana is incurring losses on the gold trade—through assaying costs, logistics, financing, and price spreads. These losses are neither imaginary nor scandalous. They are a known cost of intervention.
But it is also true that GoldBod’s returns are helping to sustain foreign exchange inflows, easing pressure on the cedi and supporting reserve accumulation at a time when traditional inflows remain constrained.
Both statements can be true.
The problem arises when communicators insist on absolutes, denying losses entirely when evidence suggests otherwise, or treating acknowledgment as betrayal. In doing so, they mirror the same error they accuse institutions like the IMF of making: simplifying a complex reality for short-term comfort.
The IMF does not object to policy trade-offs. It objects to opacity. So do markets.
Credibility Is Built on Trade-Offs, Not Perfection
No serious investor expects a crisis-era economy to produce immaculate balance sheets. What they expect is coherence: an ability to explain why costs are being incurred, where benefits are materialising, and how risks are being managed over time.
Discrediting the IMF for highlighting risks, while selectively citing it when it offers reassurance, signals something deeper than disagreement. It signals impatience with scrutiny.
And impatience with scrutiny is rarely read as confidence.
Respecting the Referee, Even When the Call Is Uncomfortable
Ghana’s economic reset is, at its core, a credibility exercise. The IMF programme is not just about fiscal targets and structural benchmarks; it is about restoring trust externally and internally.
That trust cannot be rebuilt by treating institutions as tools to be wielded only when convenient. A government secure in its policies should be able to say: yes, there are costs; yes, risks remain; and yes, the strategy is still justified.
The IMF’s caution should not be feared. It should be incorporated.
Respecting the referee only when you are winning is not strength. It is fragility disguised as triumph. And in economics, fragility is expensive; after the applause fades.
GHANA IS WORKING AGAIN