African Political Economy

THE CONGO IS NOT POOR. THE CONGO IS CONTESTED.

15 min read

The Minerals, the Mercenaries, Kabila’s Return and the Geopolitical Struggle for Control of an African State

By Lord Fiifi Quayle
African Political Economist | Sovereign Risk Analyst | Founder, Africa Macro Intelligence


INTRODUCTION: A COUNTRY THE WORLD CANNOT AFFORD TO IGNORE

There is something profoundly disturbing about the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

A country endowed with some of the world’s most strategically important mineral resources has spent decades confronting conflict, political instability, external interference and extraordinary humanitarian suffering. Its soil contains resources essential to the modern global economy, yet millions of its citizens continue to experience poverty, displacement and insecurity.

This contradiction is too difficult to overlook.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the world’s leading producers of cobalt, copper, tantalum and other strategic minerals. According to the United States Geological Survey, Congo accounted for approximately 75% of global mined cobalt production and 51% of global tantalum production in 2024.

These are not ordinary commodities. They are critical inputs into batteries, electronics, electricity networks, industrial manufacturing and the technologies shaping the future global economy.

Yet the country remains deeply vulnerable to conflict, institutional weakness and competition over the control of its natural resources.

The conventional explanation often begins and ends with ethnic tensions, armed groups, regional rivalries and humanitarian emergencies.

Those explanations matter. But they are incomplete.

The Congo crisis must also be understood through the economics of resource extraction, international strategic competition, political succession, territorial control and the commercial interests that surround the country’s extraordinary mineral wealth.

And recent developments have made this examination even more urgent.

The emergence of former President Joseph Kabila at the head of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN), a new political-military coalition incorporating the structures of the AFC-M23 movement, introduces another dimension to an already complicated conflict.

It is no longer who controls the mines.

It is who controls the territory, who governs the country, who negotiates its mineral wealth and who ultimately determines the future of the Congolese state.

1. THE WEALTH BENEATH THE CONGOLESE SOIL

The DRC possesses an extraordinary concentration of strategic natural resources.

Cobalt, copper, tantalum, gold, tin, tungsten, lithium and other minerals place the country at the centre of global industrial and technological supply chains.

The USGS 2024 assessment illustrates the scale of this strategic importance:

  • Approximately 75% of global mined cobalt production.
  • Approximately 51% of global tantalum production.
  • Approximately 13% of global mined copper production.
  • Approximately 95% of national goods and services exports by value attributable to mining.

The numbers expose a fundamental economic contradiction.

A country with this level of mineral importance should possess considerable opportunities to finance industrialisation, infrastructure, education, healthcare and technological development.

But mineral abundance does not automatically produce national prosperity.

The key issue is how the value is distributed.

Who owns the concessions? Who finances extraction? Who controls the processing facilities? Who determines export prices? How much revenue reaches the national treasury? How much value is retained within the domestic economy?

These questions are more important than simply celebrating the quantity of minerals beneath Congolese soil.

Congo’s mineral economy is dominated by private foreign operators, while the state participates through ownership interests, joint ventures, royalties and regulatory arrangements.

This is not automatically evidence of exploitation. Foreign investment can provide capital, technology and access to international markets.

However, when the extraction of strategic resources is largely controlled through external commercial and financial structures, the negotiating capacity of the host country becomes critically important.

Congo must be able to negotiate from the position of a sovereign resource owner, rather than simply a supplier of raw materials.

2. THE WEST, CHINA AND THE GLOBAL SCRAMBLE FOR CONGOLESE MINERALS

The competition for Congo’s mineral wealth cannot be understood through a simplistic Western-versus-African narrative.

China has established a substantial commercial position in the Congolese copper and cobalt industry. Chinese enterprises are important participants in major mining operations, and China remains a principal destination for Congolese mineral exports.

The United States and its Western partners, meanwhile, are increasingly concerned about their dependence on concentrated critical-mineral supply chains.

This has elevated Congo’s strategic importance.

Washington’s engagement with Kinshasa must therefore be examined within the wider context of competition over access to critical minerals, industrial supply chains and geopolitical influence.

The US-DRC strategic partnership and the wider Washington-led diplomatic framework offer opportunities for investment and security cooperation. But they also raise questions about preferential access to Congolese resources and the distribution of the economic benefits.

The important distinction is between investment that strengthens Congo’s productive capacity and arrangements that simply redirect its mineral wealth into another external supply chain.

A genuine partnership should deliver:

  • Domestic mineral processing.
  • Technology transfer.
  • Skilled employment for Congolese citizens.
  • Greater fiscal revenue.
  • Infrastructure development.
  • Transparent concession arrangements.
  • Long-term industrial capacity.

Congo should not have to choose between Chinese commercial dominance and Western strategic competition.

It should possess the institutional capacity to negotiate beneficial arrangements with every external partner.

The objective must be Congolese industrialisation, not the replacement of one external dependency with another.

3. THE EASTERN CONFLICT: WHEN TERRITORIAL CONTROL BECOMES ECONOMIC POWER

The conflict in eastern Congo is not an isolated military confrontation.

It involves decades of unresolved regional tensions, armed movements, political grievances, cross-border security concerns and competition over strategically important territories.

The M23 movement’s capture of Goma in January 2025 and Bukavu in February 2025 significantly changed the regional security environment.

The United Nations and international investigative mechanisms have documented Rwandan military support for M23. Rwanda disputes accusations of backing the movement and has repeatedly presented its security concerns in eastern Congo as central to its position.

These competing positions must be examined, but the documented consequences of the conflict cannot be ignored.

Control of territory affects access to:

  • Mining locations.
  • Transport corridors.
  • Border crossings.
  • Commercial taxation.
  • Mineral export routes.
  • Local administrative institutions.

The United Nations and other investigators have documented illegal mineral taxation, smuggling and the consolidation of economic control in areas affected by the conflict.

This is where the resource question becomes inseparable from the security question.

A mineral extracted in eastern Congo can enter a regional trading network, cross an international border, be processed elsewhere and ultimately reach a global manufacturer.

By the time it enters the international market, its original circumstances may be difficult to establish.

This is why mineral traceability is not simply a compliance exercise.

It is an instrument of economic sovereignty.

4. JOSEPH KABILA’S RETURN: THE CONFLICT ACQUIRES A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION

Perhaps the most consequential recent development is the political realignment involving former Congolese president Joseph Kabila.

On 12 October 2026, Kabila announced the formation of the Front for the Refoundation of the Nation (FRN) in Goma.

The movement incorporates the political and military structures of the former Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), including the structures associated with M23.

Its leadership includes former rebel figures such as Corneille Nangaa, Bertrand Bisimwa, Freddy Kaniki and Sultani Makenga.

The coalition has declared its intention to end what it describes as tyranny, including through the use of force.

This has become an interesting development.

Kabila is not an ordinary opposition politician. He governed Congo from 2001 to 2019 and retains historical political relationships and knowledge of the country’s institutions.

His decision to lead a political-military coalition associated with an armed rebellion changes the political character of the conflict.

The movement is no longer simply an armed challenge operating in the east. Under a former head of state, it has acquired a more explicit national political ambition.

But we must ask some difficult questions.

What does Kabila hope to achieve?

Is this an attempt to establish a new political order in Congo?

Is it an effort to mobilise former political and military networks?

Does the movement represent a broader challenge to Tshisekedi’s administration, or is its principal strength still rooted in the territories and military structures already controlled by AFC-M23?

And what would happen if the FRN were to gain influence beyond eastern Congo?

These questions matter because the political future of the DRC is now increasingly intertwined with the military situation.

Kabila’s political grievances and criticisms of Tshisekedi’s government should be examined on their own merits. But the decision to lead a coalition incorporating armed structures cannot be separated from the consequences of armed rebellion.

Political opposition and armed insurrection are not interchangeable.

The distinction matters for the future of Congolese democracy.

5. TSHISEKEDI AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

The incumbent administration cannot be excluded from this analysis.

President Félix Tshisekedi faces a serious territorial challenge in the east, a complicated regional diplomatic environment and growing domestic political tensions.

His administration has defended its approach to security and international partnerships, including the strategic relationship with Washington.

However, the political debate surrounding constitutional reform and the possibility of extending presidential tenure has generated significant concern among opponents.

The question of constitutional succession is particularly important.

Congo has experienced prolonged political disputes over presidential tenure before. Kabila’s own final years in office were marked by controversy over delayed elections and the constitutional limits on presidential power.

The country eventually experienced a peaceful presidential transfer in January 2019.

That development should not be taken lightly.

The current administration must demonstrate that national security will not become an argument for weakening constitutional safeguards.

Equally, opposition figures must demonstrate that their pursuit of political change will not further militarise the state.

The democratic future of Congo cannot be secured through an endless competition between armed political factions.

There must be space for constitutional opposition, inclusive dialogue, institutional accountability and credible elections.

The Congolese people should not be forced to choose between competing centres of political and military power.

6. THE MERCENARIES: THE PRIVATISATION OF SECURITY

The involvement of foreign private military and security contractors adds another layer to the political economy of the conflict.

One particularly important case concerns Erik Prince, founder of the former Blackwater security company and head of Vectus Global.

Reuters reported in April 2025 that Prince had reached an arrangement with the Congolese government intended to improve mineral revenue collection, secure mining operations and reduce cross-border smuggling.

A subsequent Reuters investigation published in February 2026 reported that Prince’s personnel provided drone and technical support to Congolese forces during operations around Uvira.

An AFP investigation published in October 2026 described a wider network of foreign paramilitary personnel and private security operations in the country.

The details of employment, operational authority and the relationships between different contractors are not fully transparent.

This is precisely why the subject deserves scrutiny.

A government may legitimately seek foreign security expertise. However, when private security companies operate in a country experiencing an armed conflict and simultaneously participate in activities connected to mineral revenue collection, the potential conflicts of interest require serious examination.

Who pays these contractors?

Who supervises their operations?

What legal authority do they exercise?

Are their commercial and security responsibilities separated?

Who is accountable if their activities result in civilian harm?

The central issue is not whether Congo should receive foreign security assistance.

It is whether the Congolese state retains effective control over the institutions and decisions that determine its national security.

A country should never become so dependent on external security arrangements that its sovereignty is reduced to a contractual relationship.

7. EBOLA AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION

Congo is also confronting a serious Ebola outbreak.

This must be treated with the seriousness it deserves.

Ebola is a genuine public-health emergency. Healthcare workers, affected communities and humanitarian organisations are operating in an environment complicated by insecurity, displacement and attacks on medical facilities.

There is no credible basis for suggesting that Ebola was invented to distract the world from Congo’s mineral wealth.

But there is a broader question about international attention.

Why is Congo so frequently presented to the world through images of disease, armed men, displaced families and humanitarian emergencies, while its economic structures and strategic resources receive considerably less sustained public attention?

When international reporting focuses on a humanitarian emergency, the immediate suffering understandably takes precedence.

But a country’s identity should not become synonymous with its crises.

Congo is more than Ebola.

It is more than M23.

It is more than refugees and armed militias.

It is a country with strategic natural resources, industrial potential, an important position in the global economy and a population entitled to the benefits of its national wealth.

The problem is not that humanitarian attention exists.

The problem is when humanitarian attention becomes a substitute for examining the economic and political structures that shape the country’s future.

We must be capable of discussing both.

8. THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE PROCESS: PEACE FOR WHOM?

The Washington diplomatic process between Congo and Rwanda and the Doha negotiations involving Kinshasa and AFC-M23 represent important attempts to address the conflict.

But peace agreements must be judged by their consequences, not merely their signatures.

The emergence of the FRN complicates the Doha process because the former AFC structures have now been reorganised under a new political-military leadership.

The FRN has indicated that it inherits the former coalition’s commitments, including those connected to the Doha process.

However, the political implications of Kabila’s leadership and the relationship between the FRN and its constituent armed structures require careful examination.

There is also a commercial dimension.

The international community must ensure that mineral partnerships do not simply create more predictable conditions for external extraction.

Peace must deliver security for Congolese communities, transparent mineral governance, legitimate regional trade and stronger domestic institutions.

A settlement that stabilises commercial supply chains without addressing the political and economic drivers of conflict will remain vulnerable.

Peace should not be measured exclusively by the uninterrupted movement of minerals.

It should be measured by whether Congolese citizens can live, work, trade and build their futures without fear.

9. WHO ACTUALLY BENEFITS FROM CONGO’S MINERAL WEALTH?

This is the central economic question.

The answer cannot be established by looking at mineral production figures alone.

We must examine the entire value chain.

Who owns the concessions?

Who provides the financing?

Who controls the processing infrastructure?

Who determines the prices?

Who captures the trading margins?

Who collects taxes and royalties?

Who benefits from infrastructure agreements?

Who finances security arrangements?

And what proportion of the resulting wealth reaches ordinary Congolese citizens?

The USGS data demonstrate the extraordinary importance of mining to the national economy.

However, the distribution of that wealth depends on the institutional and commercial arrangements governing the sector.

The challenge is therefore not simply foreign ownership.

It is the relationship between foreign capital, domestic institutions, political authority and the state’s ability to capture economic value.

This is where resource sovereignty must become a measurable national objective.

10. THE LESSON FOR GHANA AND AFRICA

The Congo is not a distant problem for Ghana or the rest of Africa.

Its experience provides an important warning.

Ghana possesses gold, oil, manganese, bauxite, lithium and other commercially significant resources.

But the question is not simply how much Ghana can extract.

It is how much economic value the country can retain.

Who owns the assets?

Who finances production?

Who controls processing?

How much technology is transferred?

How much revenue reaches the national budget?

What happens to the resources after export?

What industrial capabilities remain when the resources are exhausted?

These are questions of economic sovereignty.

African governments must move beyond celebrating mineral discoveries and begin measuring the national development outcomes generated by those discoveries.

The continent must build the institutional capacity to negotiate with international investors from a position of strength.

It must also recognise that resource policy, national security and political stability are interconnected.

The Congo demonstrates what happens when strategic resources, weak institutional control, regional insecurity and competing political interests converge.

It is a warning that African countries should not ignore.

CONCLUSION: THE CONGO MUST NOT REMAIN A GEOGRAPHY OF OTHER PEOPLE’S INTERESTS

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is not an empty territory awaiting foreign discovery.

It is not simply a humanitarian emergency.

It is not merely a battlefield for regional armies.

It is not an open commercial opportunity for whichever international power can secure the strongest diplomatic, financial or military position.

It is a sovereign African country.

Its minerals should finance its development.

Its territory should be protected by legitimate national institutions.

Its political future should be determined through legitimate constitutional processes.

Its people should benefit from its natural wealth.

The West has strategic interests. China has strategic interests. Regional governments have security and economic interests. International corporations have commercial interests. Congolese political and commercial elites also have interests that deserve scrutiny.

There is nothing surprising about that.

The real question is whether the Congolese state possesses the institutional strength, political legitimacy and negotiating capacity to ensure that these competing interests do not overwhelm its own national priorities.

Joseph Kabila’s alignment with the FRN has added another dimension to this contest. Tshisekedi’s administration faces questions about political legitimacy and constitutional succession. M23 and its associated structures retain territorial and military significance. Foreign security contractors are becoming increasingly visible in the country’s security economy. International powers are competing for strategic mineral relationships.

Meanwhile, ordinary Congolese citizens continue to experience the consequences.

The international community must not confuse a mineral settlement with a national settlement, or a commercial agreement with economic sovereignty.

And Africa must stop treating its resource wealth as proof of prosperity when the structures governing that wealth continue to leave so many of its people behind.

The Congo is not poor.

The Congo is extraordinarily wealthy.

But wealth without sovereignty, institutional capacity and control over value creation can become a source of vulnerability rather than prosperity.

Africa must stop measuring its wealth by what lies beneath its soil and begin measuring it by what its people are able to build from it.


Lord Fiifi Quayle
African Political Economist | Sovereign Risk Analyst
Founder & Chief Analyst, Africa Macro Intelligence

This commentary draws on publicly available reporting and institutional research, including the US Geological Survey, Reuters, AFP, the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and ACLED.

Africa Macro Intelligence African Political Economy African Resource Sovereignty African Sovereignty China-Africa Relations Cobalt Coltan Copper Critical Minerals Democratic Republic of Congo Felix Tshisekedi Front for the Refoundation of the Nation geopolitics Joseph Kabila Lord Fiifi Quayle M23 Mercenaries Resource Extraction US-Africa Relations
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About the Author
Lord Fiifi Quayle

African economic strategist, sovereign risk analyst, and public intellectual. Author of Pricing Uncertainty. Creator of the Africa Macro Intelligence Terminal.

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