By Lord Fiifi Quayle

Ghana is slowly emerging from the shadows of crisis. The country is paying its debts again, restoring credibility with creditors, and re-anchoring itself within the discipline of an IMF-backed programme. Yet stability brings its own temptation. Roads are being rolled out across the country, the idea of a 24 hour economy is gathering momentum, and government speaks openly of large, productivity-shaping investments. The central question now is not whether Ghana can grow, but how it grows; without slipping back into the habits that produced the crisis.

The case for expansion is straightforward. Roads reduce the cost of trade, link farmers to markets, and cut logistics losses that quietly drain productivity. A properly designed 24 hour economy could stretch the productive use of capital; ports, factories, warehouses-without duplicating costs. In theory, these initiatives should raise output faster than debt, allowing Ghana to service obligations without strain.

But theory has always been kinder to Ghana than practice.

The danger lies not in spending itself, but in how it is financed and managed. Ghana’s past crises were not caused by development ambition alone; they were caused by borrowing ahead of capacity, weak project selection, inflated contracts, and poor revenue capture after projects were completed. Growth happened, but the state failed to collect enough from it.

This time, the margin for error is thinner.

If Ghana returns to the international bond market too quickly, even under the banner of “credibility restored,” the country risks paying high risk premiums that cancel out the gains of discipline. Stability does not automatically mean affordability. The real test of recovery is not access to loans, but the ability to delay borrowing until growth and revenues can genuinely carry it.

That brings the discussion to internally generated funds. Can Ghana finance its ambitions largely from within?

The answer is uncomfortable but honest: not yet but it can, if reforms move from slogans to systems.

Ghana’s tax to GDP ratio remains low for an economy of its size and structure. Too much economic activity sits in the informal space, untaxed not because it is untaxable, but because enforcement is weak and incentives are poorly aligned. Property taxes, digital commerce, extractives, and high end services remain under collected. Without fixing this, no amount of growth rhetoric will sustain large scale infrastructure.

Equally important is expenditure discipline. Roads that do not open up new economic corridors, industrial zones that lack power or water, and 24 hour policies without labour productivity reforms will simply convert borrowed money into maintenance liabilities. Public investment must be fewer, larger, and more rigorously evaluated. The question should shift from “Can we build?” to “What pays for itself?”

Encouragingly, there are signs of a different conversation within government; one that links projects to revenue streams, insists on value for money audits, and treats public financial management as economic policy, not accounting housekeeping. If sustained, this approach could allow Ghana to grow without binge borrowing.

The path forward is therefore narrow but clear. Ghana must grow faster than its debt not by borrowing more cleverly, but by collecting better, spending smarter, and sequencing ambition. Roads must lead to production, not just political applause. A 24 hour economy must increase output per cedi invested, not merely extend working hours. And credibility must be measured not by how much Ghana can borrow again, but by how long it can resist the urge.

The crisis has passed. The relapse is optional.

GHANA MUST WORK AGAIN